In-Depth Analysis of 187 Publications on Hardware Reverse Engineering (Ruhr U., MPI)
Summary
Researchers from Ruhr University Bochum and the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy have published a systematic review of 187 publications spanning two decades of hardware reverse engineering (HRE) research. The paper, titled 'SoK: From Silicon to Netlist and Beyond,' examines HRE as a foundational discipline for establishing trust in semiconductor-based computing systems. The analysis maps the evolution of techniques used to deconstruct and analyze chip designs from physical silicon up through logical netlists.
Why It Matters
For manufacturers integrating custom ASICs, FPGAs, or third-party semiconductors into industrial control systems, PLCs, and automation equipment, this research consolidates two decades of adversarial techniques that could be used to extract proprietary designs or identify exploitable vulnerabilities in embedded hardware. Supply chain exposure is a direct concern: components sourced through multi-tier supplier networks carry non-zero risk of hardware trojans or IP theft, both of which HRE methods can both detect and enable. Facilities running safety-critical or IP-sensitive operations should treat this body of research as a threat intelligence update, prompting review of semiconductor sourcing policies, secure enclave usage, and physical security protocols around prototype and production hardware. Equally, the consolidation of HRE knowledge lowers the barrier for in-house teams to conduct defensive analysis of their own supply chain components.